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Vulnerability assessments are a cornerstone of contemporary disaster research. This paper shows 
how research procedures and the presentation of results of vulnerability assessments are politically 
filtered. Using data from a study of tsunami risk assessment in Portugal, the paper demonstrates 
that approaches, measurement instruments, and research procedures for evaluating vulnerabil-
ity are influenced by institutional preferences, lines of communication, or lack thereof, between 
stakeholder groups, and available technical expertise. The institutional setting and the pattern of 
stakeholder interactions form a filter, resulting in a particular conceptualisation of vulnerability, 
affecting its operationalisation via existing methods and technologies and its institutional embed-
ding. The Portuguese case reveals a conceptualisation that is aligned with perceptions prevalent 
in national government bureaucracies and the exclusion of local stakeholders owing to selected 
methodologies and assessment procedures. The decisions taken by actors involved in these areas 
affect how vulnerability is assessed, and ultimately which vulnerability reduction policies will be 
recommended in the appraisal.
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Introduction
The conceptualisation and the measurement of vulnerability have become increas-
ingly popular topics in disaster studies and risk management. There has been a major 
shift in the conceptualisation of disasters and risks since the 1980s. The ‘traditional’ 
approach to risk management that held sway until then was hazard-oriented, focus-
ing on the physical cause of a disaster, such as an earthquake or storm. Consequently, 
risks were dealt with by proposing technical solutions, typically the enhancement or 
construction of infrastructural works (Birkmann, 2006). To go beyond the limits of 
the hazard-oriented approach, the notion of vulnerability was introduced to address 
the question of why certain communities or environments are more susceptible to 
harm than are others. In addition to technical and physical factors, social factors are 
key in determining vulnerability and in managing risk (Birkmann, 2006). Differences 
between conceptualisations of vulnerability relate to the way in which social factors 
are incorporated, but there is overall agreement among scholars that vulnerability 
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arises from cultural, economic, political, and social contexts that influence both sus-
ceptibility to hazards and the capacity to respond to them (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley, 
2003; Wisner et al., 2004; Birkmann, 2006).
 Vulnerability assessments play a vital role in risk management. Crucial to current 
notions of vulnerability is not only the level of susceptibility of certain communities 
but also their capacity to anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of a 
disaster. The development of an appropriate methodology and the proper implemen-
tation of a vulnerability assessment thus generate valuable information that national, 
regional, and local governments can use to define and implement appropriate meas-
ures to decrease susceptibility and to increase the coping capacity of people exposed 
to certain hazards and risks. Given the richness of the vulnerability literature, there is 
ample choice of factors and indicators to include in a vulnerability assessment. The 
task of the vulnerability researcher, therefore, is to create or select an instrument that 
includes all relevant factors and fits the context of application. Methodological choices 
made in vulnerability assessments can have profound effects on the policy recommen-
dations and strategies that emerge from them. The identification of vulnerability, its 
description in research, and its inscription in policy all imply particular actions and 
interventions through risk management policy (Ribot, 2014). Hence the methodo-
logical choices made in vulnerability assessments have consequences for the insights 
and information that enter the process of policymaking and policy implementation.
 This paper argues that the development and application of vulnerability assess-
ments are politically filtered: some elements are excluded whereas others are included. 
An analysis of a Portuguese tsunami vulnerability reduction project is used to illus-
trate this process. The example at hand shows that political filtering happens through 
the interactions between research institutes and governmental agencies involved in 
the vulnerability assessment. It revealed that political manoeuvring within research 
groups and their interactions with policy agencies created a disciplinary divide, favour-
ing physical indicators and leaving out most socioeconomic components of the vul-
nerability assessment. By filtering out the ‘human’ side of vulnerability, policies based 
on the outcomes of the assessment will be ill-informed and misguided in mobilising 
available human resources to deal with tsunami risks effectively. The political filter-
ing process reduces especially opportunities for local risk management professionals 
and community organisations to get involved in vulnerability assessment and in devel-
oping vulnerability reduction measures. 
 First the study reviews how vulnerability assessments get filtered, resulting in a 
conceptual model that aids understanding of how political filtering occurs in the 
development of a vulnerability assessment. Next the methodology is explained and 
the case study is introduced. The following results section shows how the vulner-
ability assessment in Portugal was filtered, producing a particular conceptualisation 
and affecting the operationalisation and institutional embedding of the vulnerability 
assessment. The subsequent discussion section looks at the position of the case study 
project within a broader debate on assessments as technologies of governance. The 
paper concludes that vulnerability assessments are not apolitical tools of disaster man-
agement, but rather are filtered owing to the subjective choices of the actors involved. 
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A framework for evaluating assessments
The vulnerability approach has gradually replaced the hazard-oriented approach in 
disaster studies; the current understanding is that vulnerability emerges from inter-
related cultural, economic, environmental, political, and social processes (Birkmann, 
2006; Nelson, Adger, Brown, 2007; Cutter, 2011). Vulnerability indicates a commu-
nity’s susceptibility to catastrophic outcomes should a hazardous event occur. It is, 
therefore, a socially mediated link between a hazard and a disaster: it determines 
whether a hazardous event turns into a disaster and the severity of its impact. 
 Social vulnerability highlights the social determinants of vulnerability. Differences 
between community members’ social characteristics, such as class, disaster experience, 
ethnicity, gender, or social capital, contribute to differences in vulnerability. Although 
there is overall consensus on the social factors affecting vulnerability (Cutter, Boruff, 
and Shirley, 2003), the complexity of interactions through which social vulnerabil-
ity takes shape gives rise to multiple perspectives (Oliver-Smith, 1999). There are, 
however, several shared principles. First, a point on which most scholars agree is an 
individual’s reflexive agency, implying that people are not merely exposed to risks 
and become victims of disasters but that they participate actively in prevention, miti-
gation, or reconstruction. For Wisner et al. (2004, p. 11), human agency is central to 
their understanding of vulnerability, which they define as the characteristics of people 
and their situations that ‘influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and 
recover from the impact of a natural hazard’. Second, the inclusion of human agency 
in vulnerability approaches has implications for the perception of the biophysical com-
ponents of vulnerability. Owing to people’s active engagement, the biophysical envi-
ronment becomes socially mediated or socially constructed (Fuchs, Birkmann, and 
Glade, 2012; Birkmann et al., 2013). Third, perspectives generally coincide with dif-
ferent spheres or scales of social interaction. Birkmann (2006) presents a set of four 
widening conceptual spheres, each covering an increasing quantity of social processes 
and interactions. More encompassing conceptualisations require a more wide-ranging 
analytical instrument with which to understand the complexity underlying vulner-
ability. Conceptual choices based on these shared principles will have consequences 
for the type of work to be done when applied in a vulnerability assessment. 
 An assessment instrument to analyse vulnerability is based on three key choices: 
researchers may use one created by others; adjust one as required; or develop one 
themselves. Any instrument has to match case-specific features, which can imply the 
characteristics of a situation or specific social phenomena. Preliminary research may 
be required, so as to include, for instance, ‘indigenous interpretations’ of extreme 
events and hazards in an instrument (Wisner et al., 2004, p. 123). Another impor-
tant concern is the size and scope of datasets. The more detailed information to be 
collected, the more data to be processed and analysed. More comprehensive models 
may result in certain data being unavailable or being very costly to generate (Birkmann 
et al., 2013). Hinkel (2011) characterises these and other considerations in vulnerabil-
ity assessment instruments as deductive, inductive, normative, and non-substantial 
arguments. The latter refers to issues unrelated to vulnerability, such as the given 
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example of dataset size. Focusing on climate change vulnerability, Hinkel (2011, 
p. 204) concludes that most assessment instruments are not very functional owing to 
‘a lack of specificity about the purposes of assessing vulnerability’ in policy docu-
ments and the academic literature. This general lack of specificity perhaps has a more 
specific cause. The case study presented in this paper suggests that political choices 
within the research and policy environments deserve more attention as a major cause 
of ineffective vulnerability assessments. 
 Most vulnerability assessments aim to address particular policy questions. The 
complexity of vulnerability factors has to be translated therefore into an ordered set 
of parameters that can be understood by policymakers and planners (McLaughlin 
and Cooper, 2010, p. 234). Interactions with policymakers and governing bodies 
affect a vulnerability assessment from the outset, not only during the process of 
translating the results into adaptation strategies and interventions. The political 
processes behind vulnerability research itself have received little attention so far. 
Vulnerability assessments involve multiple actors who select approaches, develop tools, 
and apply methods. In the course of this work, value judgements may lose their vis-
ibility as normative choices often are hidden in what may seem to be an objective 
vulnerability assessment. Fuchs (2009) created a model in which an individual’s per-
ception of vulnerability is filtered initially by cultural conditions and then by com-
munication between individuals, groups, and institutions. Vulnerability research, he 
argues, has to include the filtered perceptions of actors because they affect how vul-
nerability is evaluated and what measures are taken (Fuchs, 2009). 
 This paper begins with the assumption that researchers are not exempt from having 
filtered perceptions. Whereas Fuchs applied the perception filter to community mem-
bers who experience vulnerability, this study applies it to researchers’ experiences in 
creating vulnerability assessments themselves. In the process of establishing a research 
instrument, choices regarding what and who to include have a direct bearing on 
the scope and the effectiveness of vulnerability assessment research. These delibera-
tions take place within and between research institutes, as well as in the interaction 
between science and policy. The filter (see Figure 1) thus demarcates a social space 
of interaction between researchers and policymakers representing different groups, 
institutes, and governmental bodies. Conceptual, instrumental, and institutional con-
siderations pass through the filter when creating an assessment instrument and the 
results of the assessment are filtered again before ending up in policy recommenda-
tions and proposed measures. 
 In creating an assessment study, conceptual considerations, specific features of 
the study area, research practicalities, and research team composition are all inter-
related. Research institutes may have a particular preference for certain conceptual 
frameworks that match their research capacity. For example, a hazard-oriented 
conceptualisation emphasising the physical manifestations of vulnerability is better 
served by an institute that has the instruments and the capacity to measure them. 
Such institutes also may have the capacity to design infrastructural and engineering 
solutions. Institutes with primarily social science capacities typically will address 
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human agency and the socially mediated character of the physical environment. 
Moreover, the scope of certain conceptual frameworks has implications for the meth-
ods selected. Vulnerability research from a political-ecology perspective, for instance, 
prefers community-based participatory approaches to capture elements of self-evolution 
and self-organisation that are vital for recovery and risk reduction (Oliver-Smith, 
2005). In sum, pre-existing information on the phenomenon to be assessed, practical 
concerns, and the availability of particular tools inform the choices made during 
conceptualisation. 
 The institutional location of the assessment is an important factor in the filtering 
of a vulnerability assessment. The selections made, in terms of how vulnerability is 
defined or how it is assessed, are predetermined in part by the way in which vulner-
ability assessments are institutionally embedded. This has two implications. First, the 
assessment process is affected by (internal) institutional politics. For example, Jasanoff 
(1999) concludes that questions at the heart of risk studies about agency, causation, and 
uncertainty are deeply embedded in cultural values and beliefs present in the insti-
tutional environment. Moreover, institutional embedding affects which actors and 
knowledge are included in the assessment process. Besides what has been said about 
institutional traditions and capacities affecting the conceptualisation and operation-
alisation of vulnerability, social actors frequently are organisations, social groups, or 
companies. There might be existing forms of cooperation or connections between 
certain organisations or isolation and distrust. In each organisation, particular views 
and perceptions dominate, often referred to as the institutional culture. To paraphrase 
the seminal work of Douglas (1986), what seem to be individual decisions are mostly 
an effect of how institutions think. Hence the institutional setting is an important 
factor in the shaping of vulnerability assessments. 
 Consequently, vulnerability assessments clearly are not neutral or one-size-fits-all 
methodologies that can be applied similarly in all contexts. What theories and con-
cepts are used, which physical and social characteristics are included, and how the 
vulnerability assessment is institutionally embedded are the outcomes of a process in 
which appropriate options, available ideas, instruments, and the selection of research 
teams are politically filtered. 
Figure 1. The filtering of a vulnerability assessment
Theories and concepts of vulnerability Assessment  results
Assessment  
instrument and  
research team
Policies and  
interventions
FilterCase-specific characteristics
Organisation and availability of staff
Source: authors.
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Background and methodology
The Portuguese coast is vulnerable to tsunamis (Birkmann et al., 2010). The last 
recorded tsunami was in 1755 when an earthquake in the Atlantic Ocean impacted 
the Portuguese coast (Chester and Chester, 2010). The periodicity of the event is 
estimated at 250 years, explaining recent initiatives to carry out a vulnerability assess-
ment (tsunami risk) of the Portuguese coast (Universidade de Coimbra and Câmara 
Municipal da Figueira da Foz, 2010).
 The case study presented here is the TSURIMA project, a joint research endeav-
our between the University of Lisbon and the University of Coimbra in Portugal. It 
sought to develop a tsunami vulnerability assessment and management methodology 
for four locations in the country. The University of Lisbon created tsunami propa-
gation models, while a team from the University of Coimbra conducted geographic 
information system (GIS) evaluations of social vulnerability to tsunami risk. As this 
paper relates to vulnerability research, it focuses on the work of the Coimbra team. 
 The TSURIMA project was a scientific research venture with the specific objec-
tives of being interdisciplinary and policy-oriented, yielding a good opportunity to 
investigate how different actors make choices in the creation and execution of a vul-
nerability assessment. Research was performed in spring 2013, while the TSURIMA 
project was in its initial phases, and in just one project location: Figueira da Foz, a 
coastal city and municipality at the mouth of the Mondego River in the Coimbra 
district of Portugal. At this time the assessment was still a work in progress and its 
outlines were under construction. The social processes of conceptual and methodo-
logical development were thus ongoing and clearly visible.
 Figueira da Foz is a town with some 62,000 residents located on the shore of the 
Atlantic Ocean about 200 kilometres north of Lisbon (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 
2011). Risks to the town are addressed by policy bodies at the regional and national 
level. At the local level, professionals with the Protecção Civil (Civil Protection), 
a municipal authority that combines the fire brigade, police force, Red Cross, the 
local forestry department, and the city council, implement risk management. 
 The data presented here were collected by the first author using a mixed-methods 
approach, involving document analysis, key informant interviews, and participant 
observation in relevant organisations and processes. Eleven semi-structured inter-
views were held with primary TSURIMA scientists, policymakers, and risk manage-
ment professionals. Through participant observation, information was gathered from 
meetings of the TSURIMA team to develop the assessment index and during data 
collection by researchers performing the vulnerability assessment. While following 
the TSURIMA team, additional respondents were selected for interview. All inter-
views (except for one done by e-mail) took place at the location and lasted for at 
least one hour. Interview questions covered risk perceptions, experience of disasters, 
interdisciplinarity, learning experiences, and definitions of (social) vulnerability. 
Besides the TSURIMA research team, data were collected through participatory 
observation and informal interviews with representatives of two principal institutions: 
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the Protecção Civil; and the Red Cross. The observations concentrated on the inter-
actions between these local actors and their views on tsunami risk management. As 
the research centred mainly on the work of the Coimbra team, observation of the 
Lisbon team remained limited to moments of interaction between them. The inter-
views were recorded and analysed using ATLAS-ti software. Finally, the literature 
used by TSURIMA scientists to develop their assessment and related literature on risk 
management policies relevant to the project were reviewed.
The TSURIMA project: outcomes and results
Measuring and mapping vulnerability sounds like a neutral first step in vulnerability 
reduction. It is an appealing idea to track down vulnerability, jot it on a map, and 
use the map to develop risk management strategies. The evolution of the TSURIMA 
project shows that it is not that simple. From the outset there were several decisions 
to be made by various actors, all with different opinions. This paper looks first at 
how the TSURIMA scientists perceived and conceptualised vulnerability. Next it 
examines some key elements of the process and the technologies that the scientists 
employed to translate their understanding of vulnerability into an assessment. Finally, 
it shows how the project was shaped by interaction with risk management policy. 
Conceptualisation of vulnerability
Defining vulnerability necessitates making claims about a specific set of relation-
ships: the vulnerability of a certain system to a certain threat because of certain factors. 
A definition frames these relationships, and thereby embodies certain perceptions 
and approaches (Green and McFadden, 2007). The lack of a common definition of 
vulnerability or a universal approach for evaluating vulnerability meant that the 
TSURIMA scientists had to make choices about what constitutes vulnerability in 
their assessment of Figueira da Foz. The understanding that vulnerability is the product 
of many interrelated processes leads to the conclusion that research needs to incorporate 
different scientific disciplines to gauge and reduce vulnerability successfully (Cardona, 
2004b, in Birkmann, 2006). The TSURIMA project team included geographical 
and numerical modellers, sociologists, and economists. Ideally this would generate 
a broad and inclusive vulnerability assessment in which different perceptions of vul-
nerability would result in an approved and common methodology. 
 The TSURIMA scientists all agreed on the general objective of their research: to 
improve tsunami risk management policy. The TSURIMA project was very policy-
conscious, and team members reiterated that they were producing an assessment for 
use by policymakers. During interviews, each team member expressed different ideas 
on how the TSURIMA project would benefit policy. One said that the results of the 
vulnerability assessment would simply be used to educate policymakers about tsu-
nami risk. Another hoped that the project would develop tsunami evacuation proce-
dures in cooperation with policymakers. A third suggested that the research conclusions 
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would only be presented to policymakers, who would then decide for themselves 
whether or not to integrate any of the conclusions into risk policy. Apparently the 
different viewpoints on the objective of the vulnerability assessment anticipated the 
use of its results by policymakers. In this way ideas about what policies to develop 
and implement were mixed into discussions on what conceptualisation of vulnerabil-
ity and what methodology to utilise. 
 The way in which differences in perception of the project’s objective affected the 
assessment strategy and methods became explicit in an internal TSURIMA discus-
sion on which part of the initiative is more important: the tsunami model or the 
vulnerability assessment (see Figure 2)? When talking to Coimbra team members 
about these meetings, they said that the Lisbon team did not see the vulnerability 
assessment as important, but rather, as one Coimbra researcher put it, as ‘a comple-
ment to the tsunami model’. A Lisbon scientist stated that the tsunami model was 
‘fundamental to establish useful measures for the mitigation of this sort of [tsunami] 
risk’. Note that only the Lisbon model is referred to as ‘fundamental’; the Coimbra 
contribution is not mentioned. The Coimbra team thus felt unappreciated and perhaps 
even side-tracked, creating friction and distrust within the project staff. 
 The process was finalised in 2014 and the Social Vulnerability matrix and algo-
rithm applied were published in 2015 (Barros et al., 2015). Social vulnerability is 
listed as one of four types of vulnerability, as well as morphological, structural, and 
taxable property vulnerability. Each type is given equal weight in the Composite 
Vulnerability Index. 
 The different perceptions of each other’s roles and the different contributions to 
the project influenced cooperation within the TSURIMA team. The Coimbra sci-
entists had little influence on the tsunami model generated by the Lisbon team. The 
Coimbra team was not unequivocally supportive of the tsunami model. A key scientist 
doubted its validity, saying that the model might not take into account all necessary 
factors. He illustrated his doubt by pointing out that the Lisbon model projects that 
the Cova Gala hospital will not be affected by a tsunami, even though it is practically 
Figure 2. Structure of the TSURIMA project




‘Mitigation measures for tsunami risk’
Coimbra team: 
‘How can we shape planning policy?’
Vulnerability assessment:  
Coimbra team
Source: authors.
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located on the beach. A second reason for doubt is that the Lisbon team’s tsunami 
model for Figueira da Foz diverges significantly from models produced by two national 
agencies, the Autoridade Nacional de Protecção Civil (ANPC) and the Instituto 
Português do Mar e da Atmosfera (IPMA). Each model has substantially different 
inundation predictions, according to the Coimbra scientist, who admitted that this 
has made him feel less confident in his colleagues’ model. 
 Whereas the Coimbra team had little say in the creation of the tsunami model, 
the Lisbon team was directly involved in the development of the methodology for 
the vulnerability assessment. The decision was taken to conduct the evaluation by 
creating a matrix in which different indicators of vulnerability were analysed in five 
categories, ranging from ‘1’ (worst-case scenario) to ‘-1’ (best-case scenario). Officially 
the vulnerability assessment was to be the sole responsibility of the Coimbra team, 
while the Lisbon team took care of the inundation model. In reality, the Lisbon sci-
entists helped to choose the indicators included in the matrix and even performed the 
assessment in other project locations. Hence the numerical modelling engineers from 
Lisbon had an important influence on determining how social vulnerability is appraised. 
This influence on the social side of the TSURIMA project was remarkable because 
the responsible engineer lacked knowledge of the social aspects of vulnerability. 
During one meeting, she said ‘I don’t understand’ each time a theory of social vul-
nerability was discussed. The engineer particularly objected to the investigation of 
certain aspects of social vulnerability, such as risk perception and disaster experience, 
using qualitative methods. She doubted the value of methods that did not produce 
quantifiable data and said she ‘didn’t understand’ how qualitative data could be part 
of an assessment. The chosen social vulnerability matrix reflects hesitation in using 
qualitative indicators, with the use of only quantifiable indicators (Barros et al., 2015). 
The major influence of the numerical modelling engineers on the social vulnerabil-
ity assessment effectively reframed social vulnerability as a concept that should be 
gauged using measurable quantitative indicators. 
 All team members agreed that vulnerability is a factor in risk, but they disagreed 
on the extent and the nature of the relation between vulnerability and risk. This 
led to discussions on which framework would map vulnerability in such a way as to 
achieve effective risk management. Eventually the TSURIMA project based its vul-
nerability assessment for tsunamis on the frameworks of Papathoma et al. (Papathoma 
and Dominey-Howes, 2003; Papathoma et al., 2003) and Cutter et al. (Cutter, Boruff, 
and Shirley, 2003; Cutter, 2011). Papathoma’s vulnerability assessment has a distinct 
focus on infrastructural and built environment aspects, which the TSURIMA team 
believed to be too restrictive. The team chose to complement it, therefore, with 
indicators based on the work of Cutter, who is more inclusive of the social aspects 
of vulnerability, such as equity issues. The team settled on an assessment framework 
that is a direct copy of an assessment framework for social aspects of vulnerability by 
one of the TSURIMA scientists: the adaptation of Cutter by Mendes (2009), which 
was developed to determine social vulnerability in the Central Region of Portugal. 
 TSURIMA’s ‘field evaluation matrix’ used at the time of the authors’ research 
analysed data on: support capacity (education, hospitals, social security facilities, and 
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transport options); the presence of fixed or moveable objects; and the characteristics 
of a building (such as its orientation, the number of windows, or the use of building 
materials). At this point, the team had not yet decided on the social and economic 
indicators; although the adaptation of Mendes (2009) was included with ‘draft’ status. 
In the final assessment the team chose the following indicators: seasonal occupation; 
residential urban centres; population dynamics; disadvantaged social contexts; urban 
areas with commerce; and population dependant on social support (Barros et al., 2015). 
 The TSURIMA scientists thus conceptualised vulnerability in such a way that the 
complex social elements of vulnerability and resilience were excluded. There remained 
differences in their perceptions of the research objective and of the relative weight 
of the inundation model versus the vulnerability assessment. These differences were 
not well discussed or clarified. From the project perspective, the unresolved situation 
was a good thing, since it allowed all team members to remain involved. At the same 
time, the resulting conceptualisation process meant that social capital, learning, or 
social organisation are all left out of the current assessment. TSURIMA’s construc-
tions of vulnerability offer little opportunity to include these elements. Key aspects 
of social vulnerability, such as resilience, social and political networks, social protec-
tion, and well-being (see Cannon et al., 2003, in Birkmann, 2006), do not fit within 
an engineering-based concept of vulnerability. Conceptualisation issues, therefore, 
are one factor in determining the assessment method, together with operationalisa-
tion and institutional location, as the following subsections show.
Process and technology
The TSURIMA team chose to use GIS to assess social vulnerability. GIS methods 
allow researchers to include different kinds of data and to translate it into particular 
projections on geographical maps. As vulnerability is determined by a diverse set of 
factors, the ability of GIS to express the combined effect of these factors makes it very 
suitable for vulnerability research (McLaughlin and Cooper, 2010, p. 233). According 
to Weichselgartner (2001, p. 89), GIS is ‘prompting us to reconsider our understand-
ing of vulnerability’, because it allows scientists to make separate maps of different 
aspects of vulnerability and then to overlay them to create a single vulnerability map. 
 The making of the assessment index was a key process in the TSURIMA research. 
The selection of indicators determined which data would be collected and thereby 
how vulnerability would be evaluated in the project. By including certain indicators 
and excluding others, actors’ methodological choices in the design of an assessment 
effectively constituted the representation of vulnerability, and by extension the meas-
ures that could be taken to reduce it. Indicators act as categories of collected data. 
Quantitative indicators, however, are socially mediated too, as often they are con-
tested and subject to self-interest, disciplinary biases, or simple misunderstanding 
(Porter, 1995). Furthermore, the decision to emphasise quantifiable indicators pre-
cluded the use of important vulnerability (and adaptability) factors that did not lend 
themselves to quantification.
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 The TSURIMA field team collected data for a set of built environment indica-
tors for every building in the tsunami inundation zone. The researchers evaluated 
how each building scored in relation to the indicators in the assessment matrix, such 
as building material or number of windows. Scores ranged from ‘1’ (worst-case 
scenario) to ‘-1’ (best-case scenario). The data were entered into the GIS software. 
Secondary sources, such as the national census or datasets of utility companies, were 
used for the collection of data on social indicators. The same scoring system was 
employed. The team then combined all of the data on a map of social vulnerability. 
The complexity of the related social and natural vulnerability factors was reduced 
to a limited set of ‘mappable’ indicators. Physical infrastructure and buildings are 
tangible and have a fixed geographic location. Such data can be processed by GIS 
software in a rather straightforward manner. Cultural, economic, political, or social 
aspects of vulnerability usually are less tangible and require a longer route through 
questionnaires, interviews, or the use of proxy indicators, followed by interpretation 
of the results and translation into information packages that fit into a GIS model. To 
measure ‘quality of life’, for example, the TSURIMA model uses proxies that are 
tangible and geographically fixed, such as the number of pharmacies in an area or the 
presence of leisure and sport equipment (Mendes, 2009). But even these proxies were 
excluded from the final Composite Vulnerability Index (Barros et al., 2015). Given 
TSURIMA’s engineering-oriented and quantitative understanding of vulnerabil-
ity, it became especially difficult to include qualitative and socially-oriented data. 
Consequently, the decision to use GIS methods for the vulnerability assessments shapes 
what can be examined. The GIS and engineering-dominated nature of TSURIMA 
has resulted in an assessment framework with an emphasis on quantitative indicators 
related to physical infrastructure and the built environment. 
 The Lisbon team decided against using more participatory forms of research. 
Members of the Coimbra team said that they had proposed to invite local experts to 
share their knowledge of the community’s social vulnerability via Q Methodology.1 
This approach was seen as a solution to the lack of secondary data on indicators that 
were not related to the built environment. Coimbra team members said that the 
Lisbon team had rejected the suggestion to use Q Methodology. We were unable to 
identify the reason for the rejection, but the reluctance of the head engineer regard-
ing the use of qualitative data on risk perception (described earlier) may have played 
a part. Overall, the TSURIMA project does not offer any space to include local 
knowledge of community members. There is no knowledge exchange between the 
TSURIMA scientists and the community members of Figueira da Foz. The assessment 
index did not include any open indicators that could accommodate citizen knowledge. 
 The TSURIMA assessment did not consider scale and historical context in shap-
ing vulnerability. This is a serious omission. A community’s vulnerability builds up 
over time, making historical context or time a fundamental element in understand-
ing a disaster (Oliver-Smith, 1999). Communal history or memory thus represent 
important alternative variables in TSURIMA’s matrix (Oliver-Smith, 2005). The 
research team decided only to assess indicators at the municipal and local (inundated 
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area) level. Regional or global factors in Figueira da Foz’s vulnerability, such as the 
Iberian Peninsula economic crisis or deforestation in Portugal’s hinterland, are left 
out of the assessment. Research has shown that such large-scale factors have serious 
consequences for local-scale disasters (see, for example, Comfort et al., 1999). The 
work of Delaney et al. (2014) also emphasises the relevance of combining the house-
hold and national levels in an analysis of vulnerability. The TSURIMA scientists 
included Cutter’s ideas on the importance of social inequality and other social factors 
in their conceptualisation of vulnerability (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley, 2003; Cutter, 
2011). Nevertheless, the indicators in the vulnerability assessment remained predomi-
nantly related to physical infrastructure, the built environment, and the demographic 
composition of the area. These kind of indicators mostly pertain to physical vulner-
ability. By depending on these indicators in the research, physical vulnerability comes 
to determine vulnerability as a whole, leaving little room for social vulnerability. 
In its understanding of social vulnerability, as well as in relation to the process and 
technology used to gauge social vulnerability, the TSURIMA project remained very 
‘engineering-oriented’, as one team member put it. It is clear that the decision to 
develop a quantitative concept of vulnerability was informed in part by the availabil-
ity of assessment tools, particularly GIS.
Institutional location
Portuguese risk management policy does not use social vulnerability assessments as 
a tool in risk reduction or disaster preparation (Mendes, 2009). The exception to this 
rule is the 2011 Plano Regional do Ordenamento do Território do Centro (PROT), 
the regional spatial planning policy—some members of the TSURIMA team were 
involved in creating this regional social vulnerability assessment instrument. The 
current TSURIMA framework is based on the framework employed in the PROT 
(described in Mendes, 2009). Hence, social vulnerability assessments are relatively 
new to Portuguese policymakers and therefore it is relevant to discuss the location 
of the TSURIMA project within Portuguese risk management policy. The way in 
which TSURIMA scientists positioned their project with respect to risk management 
policy and policymakers is also an important socially-mediated process that affects 
how vulnerability is conceptualised and operationalised.
 Risk management falls under spatial planning in Portuguese policy. This catego-
risation of risk suggests the prevalence of a notion that risk and disaster can be planned 
and controlled, as is common in the traditional hazard-oriented approach to risk 
(Birkmann, 2006). One aspect of this approach is that it is more difficult to allow for 
uncertainty in the policies. This means that TSURIMA likewise feels pressure to 
eliminate uncertainty from its results if it wants them to be incorporated in policy. 
Essentially that is the goal of a vulnerability assessment: through its measuring and 
indexing procedures it reduces risk and vulnerability to simple indicators that eliminate 
complexity and uncertainty (Hinkel, 2011). What is more, linking risk to spatial plan-
ning reinforces the territorial dimension of risk. The TSURIMA project echoed this 
focus on space by creating a GIS map of tsunami vulnerability. 
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 Portuguese risk management policymakers and practitioners at all levels of gov-
ernment divided risk into two categories: natural and technological. The former refers 
to risk caused by natural hazards only, whereas the latter is anthropogenic. The only 
exception to this categorisation is an outreach flyer by the local Protecção Civil of 
Figueira da Foz, in which a separate category of ‘mixed risk’ has been allowed for 
forest fires. The strict division of risk as either natural or technological is remarkable, 
because it is generally acknowledged that disasters are always the product of inter-
action between natural and social factors (Birkmann, 2006). Actors involved in risk 
management in Figueira da Foz shared this understanding of disasters, as illustrated 
by the comments of a risk management professional in Figueira da Foz:
In my opinion, ‘natural’ disasters don’t exist. Anthropic disasters exist. An example: if 
there’s an earthquake in the Sahara, the problem for us is zero. If there’s a flood in the 
Amazon forest, for us it gives zero problems. A natural disaster is when you combine humans 
with nature: then you have a disaster.
 Yet, somehow this understanding has not been integrated into policy or manage-
ment strategies. The strict division of risk in policy had implications for the way in 
which the TSURIMA team could deal with risk and vulnerability in its assessment. 
It left little wiggle room for it to come up with vulnerability indicators involving 
‘mixed’ risk factors. There was no possibility for ‘and/and’ categories. Instead, the 
TSURIMA project was forced to choose ‘either/or’ indicators, taking a social or a 
natural approach to risk. 
 Coastal risk management in Portugal often is criticised for concentrating on hard 
infrastructural solutions, both by scientists (see Schmidt et al., 2013) and by policy-
makers interviewed in this research. However, policymakers and risk management 
professionals continued to suggest infrastructural measures, such as building pro-
tective sea walls, when they were asked about how to deal with coastal risks. In this 
institutional context, therefore, it made sense for the TSURIMA project to select the 
natural/physical approach to vulnerability and to concentrate on built environment 
indicators. Research with an emphasis on construction and infrastructure matches the 
policymakers’ expectations and wishes, and thus is more likely to be adopted. 
 Apart from thinking about policymakers’ expectations, the TSURIMA team also 
took into account certain assumptions about policymakers’ behaviour when shaping 
the project. According to the scientists, it is hard to convince policymakers or pri-
vate sector agents to invest in long-term risk management strategies, as these actors 
want to see immediate results. So, the team decided to contribute to what it calls 
‘prevention and proactiveness’, which means policies focusing on disaster preparedness 
and vulnerability reduction rather than on adaptation or resilience. The TSURIMA 
team translated its objectives very specifically into what one scientist described as 
‘creating means for an accurate alert system and [. . .] effective evacuation procedures’. 
The scientists were afraid that if they persisted with long-term strategies, policymakers 
would simply ignore their advice. 
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 Political willingness to act is a universal concern in disaster management. Daniels 
(2013) shows that for politicians in the United States, it makes more political sense to 
invest in reactive disaster management strategies than in proactive vulnerability reduc-
tion strategies. Helping disaster victims results in more political gain than preventing 
disasters from occurring, after all. The TSURIMA scientists thus seemed to work 
as if policymakers were watching over their shoulders. Such hierarchical relations 
seem to dominate the institutional culture in which the project functioned. There was 
a strong sense that research should fit with a perception of what policymakers want. 
Coastal risk management is implemented in Portugal by the Agência Portuguesa do 
Ambiente, the environmental bodies of local and regional government, by policymak-
ers who have a background in natural sciences and who think in terms of engineer-
ing solutions capable of being executed in the short run. This institutional setting 
preselects a focus on infrastructure to which the TSURIMA team adhered in the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of its assessment. 
 As mentioned, TSURIMA research relied on scientific knowledge and excluded 
the knowledge of non-scientific experts or locals. This is not a unique situation in 
Portuguese research or policy. There is a wider context in Portugal of policymakers 
excluding non-scientific knowledge in their decision-making, at least in risk and 
environmental policy (Nunes and Matias, 2004a, 2004b; Schmidt et al., 2013). One 
policymaker said, ‘[i]n general, the local authorities are not used to involving the 
local community in this process’. Another added, ‘[t]hey [citizens] basically don’t 
have any role’. Policymakers, risk management professionals, and scientists all lim-
ited the role of citizens in risk management to ‘being aware’, as they called it. Risk 
management policies shared this perspective: they only saw a passive role for the public, 
who needed to be educated by professionals to become aware of risks. For instance, 
when discussing public participation, the coastal zone policy GIZC (Gestão Integrada 
da Zona Costeira) went no further than the aim to ‘foster commitment and shared 
responsibility of citizens through the provision of knowledge and technical training’ 
(MAOTDR, 2007, p. 48). Citizens were considered as objects to which knowledge 
is disclosed, not subjects who participate in the gathering of this knowledge. Such a 
perspective of community involvement cuts off the role of the community in vulner-
ability reduction at the level of awareness. This contrasts with most approaches to 
vulnerability reduction, in which awareness or risk perception are seen as one factor 
of vulnerability, but certainly not the only factor (see, for example, Eckert et al., 2012). 
Discussion
Scientific research and policy frequently are mutually constitutive: they work together 
because scientific research can fill gaps and reduce uncertainty in current policy, thereby 
justifying this policy (and its makers) as a mode of governance (Jasanoff and Wynne, 
1998). Vulnerability assessments are becoming an integral tool in risk and disaster 
reduction policymaking and planning, making them technologies of governance, 
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which, through their choices, produce and reproduce certain relationships between 
policymakers, researchers, and citizens. 
 Like all technologies, a vulnerability assessment is a tool that is socially mediated. 
The construction and employment of an assessment implies choices about technolo-
gies and about relationships with the world and other actors. This paper, through 
the case study, has analysed the consequences of this reality. The politics by which 
research agendas and policy agendas are mutually shaped act as a filter on the crea-
tion of vulnerability assessments. The technocratic and built environment solutions 
of TSURIMA can be seen as representative of the dominant discourse in Western 
countries that tends to see humans and society as separate from and in control of 
nature (Oliver-Smith, 2004). It begs the question as to which indicators would be the 
focus of an assessment matrix developed by a team outside of Europe or North America. 
 It is relevant to consider how vulnerability assessments originate, because the deci-
sions made in their conceptualisation and operationalisation have serious implications 
for the disaster and/or risk management strategies that can be derived from these 
evaluations. A vulnerability assessment that, as in the case of the TSURIMA project, 
takes little note of the agency of social actors will provide a governing body with little 
incentive to let individuals and organisations participate in disaster prevention, miti-
gation, or reconstruction. It is important to note that the issues outlined here about 
the political filtering of the conceptualisation, operationalisation, and institutional 
embedding of assessments are not limited to vulnerability studies. Similar analyses 
also are emerging in reference to forms of quantitative assessments in other fields, 
such as lifecycle analysis as a means of measuring carbon footprints in dairy produc-
tion (Weiler et al., 2014) and ecosystem service appraisals for gauging the economic 
benefits derived from nature (Lakerveld et al., 2015). Taken together, these indicate a 
pressing need for a broad critical reflection on assessments as technologies of governance. 
 This paper makes clear that the conceptualisation of vulnerability, risk, and dis-
aster is not primarily an abstract discussion in a neutral academic environment, but 
rather is influenced by disciplinary factors across natural science, engineering, and 
social sciences. The case study shows that preferred repertoires, tried methods, and 
available expertise within research institutes and research teams affect the way in 
which the relationship between the biophysical and social factors of vulnerability is 
perceived. When it comes to such complex developmental issues, actors differ in their 
understanding of events and disagree about the meaning that should be attached to 
events and variables ( Jasanoff, 2002, p. 268; Ribot, 2014). The differences in percep-
tion of risk, for instance, are illustrated by the fact that TSURIMA differs from other 
models in its predictions of tsunami inundation in Figueira da Foz. Each has appar-
ently conceptualised risk in its own way, resulting in distinctly different outcomes. The 
close connection between conceptual, operational, and institutional issues justifies 
more attention to the latter in addressing social vulnerability in assessments. Again, this 
is not an idiosyncrasy characterising vulnerability assessments only. Considerations 
of structuring data, for example, are common in any evaluations and studies of a cer-
tain size. Hinkel (2011, p. 203) labels such considerations as ‘non-substantial’ because 
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they are not based on knowledge or value judgements about vulnerability. This study 
demonstrates that methods and measuring instruments are inherently connected 
with the institutional politics of research organisations and therewith have a substan-
tial effect on the conceptualisation and measurement of vulnerability. 
 The study argues for a more reflexive understanding and discussion of the opera-
tionalisation of a vulnerability assessment as a technology of governance. Scientists 
choose certain technologies and methodologies to produce their results. The TSURIMA 
vulnerability assessment is part of a tsunami risk research endeavour that filters social 
phenomena to allow for the use of particular methodologies and forms of data col-
lection. The translation of social phenomena into numerical data reconstitutes these 
phenomena in a way that loses much of the original complexity of social vulnera-
bility factors. The case study shows that the engineer-side of the TSURIMA team had 
dominant assumptions about vulnerability, which ultimately reconstituted vulnerabil-
ity in such a way that elements of human agency and social dynamics were locked out. 
The choice to use GIS played an important part in this process. Given the importance 
of geographical data in tsunami risk management one can expect GIS applications 
to appear increasingly in vulnerability assessments, as well as in similar evaluations of 
processes that try to capture the voice of local citizens and organisations (Epstein, 
Pawar, and Simon, 2015). Consequently, this papers suggests further research on how 
GIS or other tools shape vulnerability assessments, and creative ways of integrating 
GIS into complex social dynamics.
 Technologies are embedded in the institutional and social environments in which 
they are employed. Existing policies, or scientists’ beliefs about these policies, influ-
ence scientists’ choices in the construction of their assessments ( Jasanoff and Wynne, 
1998). Hence this study proposes that scientists’ choices in relation to the conceptualisa-
tion and operationalisation of their research can be better understood as emergent 
from the institutional setting of the work rather than from objective scientific ration-
ality. The case study served to demonstrate that available research tools, organisational 
settings, and institutional cultures acted as steering mechanisms in the TSURIMA 
team’s decision-making. The culture within a policy institution is such that informa-
tion is selected that is easy for non-experts to digest and preferably expressed in straight 
numbers, resulting in a reduction in complexity and uncertainty. The TSURIMA 
scientists took these policy preferences into account in the creation of their vulner-
ability assessment. Moreover, the case study reveals that previous institutional con-
figurations, such as existing risk management policies, influence how the technology 
of the vulnerability assessment is deployed. Such arrangements of technology reaffirm 
existing configurations, including the unequal distribution of wealth or power (Jasanoff, 
2002). Wherever there is strong involvement of government departments or minis-
tries, these institutional cultures often have country-specific characteristics, includ-
ing the options of citizens to participate in these processes (Horst et al., 2007). If one 
translates this to the field of (social) vulnerability research, it means that one needs 
to be careful that vulnerability reduction strategies based on prior policy or scientific 
frameworks do not simply re-inscribe vulnerability rather than reduce it. 
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Conclusion
Green and McFadden (2007) argue that understanding the social mediation of vul-
nerability assessments is necessary to develop new means of addressing vulnerability. 
Many vulnerability assessments are created to do exactly that: to contribute to find-
ing new strategies for dealing with risk and disaster. Whichever strategies may emerge 
from vulnerability assessments, however, it remains vital to recognise that these eval-
uations are themselves socially mediated processes, a fact that has implications for 
the vulnerability reduction plans that ultimately materialise from the assessments.
 The analysis of the TSURIMA project demonstrates how internal team dynamics 
and an objective of policy integration filtered out most social components of vulner-
ability, with the partial exception of those that could be quantified easily and were 
connected to physical indicators. In the TSURIMA case, the political filter produced 
an assessment with a limited conceptualisation of vulnerability in which available 
methodologies and research instruments had a substantial bearing on its operation-
alisation. This stemmed from the specific institutional embedding of the endeavour. 
The TSURIMA project conceptualised vulnerability from an engineering perspec-
tive and operationalised vulnerability through easily quantifiable and mappable indi-
cators in GIS, resulting in the exclusion of complex social elements of vulnerability. 
This was not an a priori decision, but instead emerged from choices made about the 
assessment’s structure such that it could not include them. 
 The processes concerning the political creation of vulnerability evident in the 
TSURIMA project probably will have long-term effects on how vulnerability is 
assessed and addressed in Portugal. The strict division of assessment variables into 
either physical or socioeconomic categories prevents effective risk management and 
disaster prevention because it omits the causes of risk. Oliver-Smith (1999) reasons 
that separating physical from socioeconomic variables in evaluating vulnerability is 
equal to separating cause and effect, since it means separating hazards from disasters. 
By extension, this process removes vulnerability from the discussion of disaster and 
risk and the question concerning ‘why’ a disaster occurred cannot be asked. A related 
effect of the TSURIMA methodology is the recreation of vulnerability in any post-
disaster reconstruction (Comfort et al., 1999). The focus on the physical element of 
vulnerability means that reconstruction policy will emphasise this element without 
considering the environmental, institutional, social, or technical factors that led to 
this element’s vulnerability. Moreover, local experts and citizens are excluded from 
playing any part in vulnerability reduction strategies when assessments do not assign 
any agency or individual risk management capacity to non-scientific actors. Phenomena 
related to social organisation, learning, innovation, or social capital probably will be 
missing from policies based on this type of research. 
 Since vulnerability assessments often are specifically designed to contribute to 
policy, they offer an interesting perspective on the mutually constitutive relation-
ship between science and policy. Acting as technologies of governance, they sustain 
and reinforce existing forms of study of risk and dealing with disaster. They may well 
re-inscribe patterns of organisation and practice among scientists, policymakers, and 
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citizens that cause vulnerability, instead of breaking down these patterns. This paper 
has shown that vulnerability assessments are not straightforward, neutral, and uni-
versal tools in disaster management. Rather, they are prone to internal and political 
forces that determine the content and outcome of the evaluation, which in turn has 
implications for disaster policy based on the assessment.
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Endnotes
1 Q Methodology is used to examine how people think about a certain topic, such as tsunami risk 
(ISSSS, 2011). Participants rank statements in a procedure called ‘Q Sort’ (Previte, Pini, and Haslam-
McKenzie, 2007). 
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Ambiente; do Ordenamento do Território e do Desenvolvimento Regional, Lisbon.
McLaughlin, S. and J.A.G. Cooper (2010) ‘A multi-scale coastal vulnerability index: a tool for coastal 
managers?’. Environmental Hazards. 9(3). pp. 233–248. 
Mendes, J.M. (2009) ‘Social vulnerability indexes as planning tools: beyond the preparedness paradigm’. 
Journal of Risk Research. 12(1). pp. 43–58. 
Nelson, D.R., W.N. Adger, and K. Brown (2007) ‘Adaptation to environmental change: contributions 
of a resilience framework’. Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 32 (November). pp. 395–419. 
Nunes, J.A. and M. Matias (2004a) Agonistic Spaces, Contentious Politics and the Trials of Governance: 
Environmental Policies and Conflict in Portugal. STAGE (Science, Technology and Governance in 
Europe) Discussion Paper. No. 21. Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra.
Nunes, J.A. and M. Matias (2004b) Science, Technology and Governance in Portugal. STAGE (Science, 
Technology and Governance in Europe) Discussion Paper. No. 22. Centro de Estudos Sociais, Coimbra.
Oliver-Smith, A. (1999) ‘“What is a disaster?”: Anthropological perspectives on a persistent question’. 
In A. Oliver-Smith and S.M. Hoffman (eds.) The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective. 
Routledge, New York, NY. pp. 18–34.
Oliver-Smith, A. (2004) ‘Theorizing vulnerability in a globalized world: a political-ecological per-
spective’. In G. Bankoff, G. Frerks, and D. Hilhorst (eds.) Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development 
and People. Earthscan, London. pp. 10–24
Vulnerability assessments as a political creation: tsunami management in Portugal 747
Oliver-Smith, A. (2005) ‘Communities after catastrophe’. In S.E. Hyland (ed.) Community Building 
in the Twenty-First Century. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, NM. pp. 45–70.
Papathoma, M. and D. Dominey-Howes (2003) ‘Tsunami vulnerability assessment and its implications 
for coastal hazard analysis and disaster management planning, Gulf of Corinth, Greece’. Natural 
Hazards and Earth System Sciences. 3(6). pp. 733–747. 
Papathoma, M., D. Dominey-Howes, Y. Zong, and D. Smith (2003) ‘Assessing tsunami vulnerability, 
an example from Herakleio, Crete’. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences. 3(5). pp. 377–389. 
Porter, T.M. (1995) Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ.
Previte, J., B. Pini, and F. Haslam-McKenzie (2007) ‘Q methodology and rural research’. Sociologia 
Ruralis. 47(2). pp. 135–147. 
Ribot, J. (2014) ‘Cause and response: vulnerability and climate in the Anthropocene’. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies. 41(5). pp. 667–705. 
Schmidt, L., P. Prista, T. Saraiva, T. O’Riordan, and C. Gomes (2013) ‘Adapting governance for 
coastal change in Portugal’. Land Use Policy. 31 (March). pp. 314–325.
Universidade de Coimbra and Câmara Municipal da Figueira da Foz (2010) Plano Municipal de 
Emergência de Protecção Civil. Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra-Centro de Estudos 
de Geografia e Ordenamento do Território, Figueira da Foz.
Weichselgartner, J. (2001) ‘Disaster mitigation: the concept of vulnerability revisited’. Disaster Preven-
tion and Management. 10(2). pp. 85–95. 
Weiler, V., H.M.J. Udo, T. Viets, T.A. Crane, and I.J.M. De Boer (2014) ‘Handling multi-functionality 
of livestock in a life cycle assessment: the case of smallholder dairying in Kenya’. Current Opinion 
in Environmental Sustainability. 8. pp. 29–38. 
Wisner, B., P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, and I. Davis (2004) At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability 
and Disasters. Second edition. Routledge, New York, NY.
